New journal article from the research team behind the ‘Developing government information and accountability systems for combating serious organised crime: Medellín demonstration project’

Check out the new journal article by Christopher Blattman, Gustavo Duncan, Benjamin Lessing and Santiago Tobón, ‘Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance’ in The Review of Economic Studies, or through the open access National Bureau of Economic Research. The article, building on research part-funded by SOC ACE, explores why duopolies of gang rule emerge in both weaker and stronger states, including how state and gang rule can be strategic complements. The article looks into the question of whether increasing state presence could increase incentives for gang rule. The research has shown, that in the case of Medellín, gangs exogenously closer to state presence developed more governance over time to protect drug rents from police, suggesting that new strategies for countering criminal governance may be needed. Check out other related publications on the SOC ACE project page.