New Journal Article Examines How Gangs Govern in Areas with Limited State Control - Medellín, Colombia

Christopher Blattman, Gustavo Duncan, Benjamin Lessing, and Santiago Tobón have published a new paper titled Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance in The Review of Economic Studies, Oxford Academic (see open access).

This new journal article looks at criminal governance, where criminal groups govern millions worldwide, with a specific focus on Medellín, Colombia. Even in strong states, gangs resolve disputes and provide security, and in many cases, gangs fill vacuums of official order. There is a general presumption in the field that increasing state presence should crowd out criminal governance, but the research in this article shows that state and gang rule are sometimes complements. Drawing on extensive qualitative interviews and a city-wide representative survey, and using a geographic regression continuity design, the research shows that gang rule can best be weakened by targeting gangs’ illicit revenue. However, the research also points to an important caveat, a ‘terrible policy trade-off' for city governments, with evidence that weakening gangs could make their neighbourhoods more violent and coercive.

See SOC ACE Briefing Note: The terrible trade-off: how the hidden cost of organised crime harms cities, and what can be done about it.