This project applies lessons from irregular warfare to countering organized crime. Irregular warfare is often defined as a violent competition over legitimacy, and it subsumes the problems of terrorism, insurgency, and political instability. Phase 1 of this research project established the commonalities between organized crime and irregular warfare: their shared nature and the pitfalls relating to response. On this basis, Phase 2 presents a Framework for Analysis and Action originally designed for irregular warfare but adapted here to the context of organized crime. The Framework consists of two “parts”: the Strategic Estimate (which maps the problem, explores its drivers, frames, and strategies, and critiques the current response) and the Course of Action (which uses the Estimate to design an appropriate strategy, complete with a theory of success, phasing, assumptions, and metrics). In a third phase of this project, the modified framework will be tested through application to key cases.

Organised crime actors can be spoilers in peace processes or partners in peace. Negotiating with organised crime groups and addressing criminal agendas in peace processes has become a reality in practice. It may be preferable in contexts where repressive tactics have failed to resolve the problem or worse, have fuelled more violence and criminality. Out of options, state actors have turned to negotiation. Negotiation may not only be considered preferable, but also necessary where criminal groups have strong territorial control, filling governance gaps and gaining legitimacy. International peace operations have also begun to recognise the need to address SOC to avoid entrenching criminal structures in the post-conflict state.