Awareness has grown in recent years over the role that Chinese Professional Money Laundering Organisations (PMLOs) play in facilitating transnational crime and the threat that this poses to countries in the West. Whilst their rise can be seen to coincide with Chinese state decisions, such as its capital controls that prevent the free flow of money out of the country, there is little research on the potential links between Chinese PMLOs and the Chinese state, including on the question as to whether Chinese PMLO activity should be considered alongside other state threats. This research will, a) look into the evolution of the Chinese PMLO threat, comparing well-established operations in the US and Canada with more nascent operations seen in Europe, and b) explore their role in the context of Chinese state activity.

In the last decade, states have faced a rising tide of hostile activities from other states and their proxies, often referred to as ‘state threats’. In a series of SOC ACE supported workshops in 2023, a taskforce of experienced experts and practitioners identified the need for a more nuanced definition of state threats. This project addresses the language used to discuss state threats or similar concepts (e.g., hybrid, greyzone), and, using a clearer conceptual framework, map out the current character of state threats.

Information manipulation has been a growing concern in recent years, particularly in relation to the disinformation tactics employed by authoritarian regimes. However, the role of non-state actors, such as organised crime (OC) groups, in information manipulation has been largely overlooked. This evidence review aims to fill this gap by examining the various ways in which OC groups manipulate information to achieve their objectives and those of actors connected to them. Drawing on Nicholas Barnes' concept of 'political criminality' as well as on Makarenko’s OC-terrorism nexus framework, this study examines the varying degrees of proximity between criminal actors and the state …

This project examines how Russia is using illicit financial flows (IFF) to support its military campaign against Ukraine and to further its wider foreign policy goals. The scale of Russian use of illicit financial networks has increased rapidly since February 2022. Unless effectively countered, Russia's use of financial and economic tools will give it an advantage in its war against Ukraine and may begin to pose a potential systemic threat to international financial and trading systems. The research seeks to conceptualise how Russia uses illicit finance in political interference and information campaigns around the world, and how these dynamics may be changing in the new context of the war in Ukraine.

This project examines why third countries – countries neither sending sanctions or the target of them – either facilitate sanctions evasion and avoidance (SEA) or support efforts to counter it. It focuses on sanctions relating to Russia since February 2022 and it based on rapid review of the thematic literature on SEA and empirical research in 13 third countries. Our analysis examines how flows of Russian financial and human capital and patterns of SEA changed since February 2022; what factors affect either facilitation of or support to counter SEA; what are the types of individuals/organisations that facilitate SEA, and what methodologies and typologies do they use.

This research is part of the project ‘Monitoring the evolution of the illicit economy in Afghanistan’ which seeks to develop an overarching framework to better understand how a monitoring system for illicit markets in Afghanistan could operate. This will provide policy-makers in Europe and elsewhere with more advanced tools for scenario planning illicit trade developments and thereby formulate more effective policy responses against them. The research paper examines Afghanistan’s narcotics trade and smuggling patterns, which are intertwined in different ways with the economic fate of the Afghan state and society.

With the fall of the Ghani government in August 2021 and the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, the future of the international community’s financial relationships with the governing regime in Kabul should be reassessed. An understanding of the difference between illicit finance risks and terrorist financing risks emanating from the country, as well as the nexus between them, is critical for this purpose.