Information manipulation has been a growing concern in recent years, particularly in relation to the disinformation tactics employed by authoritarian regimes. However, the role of non-state actors, such as organised crime (OC) groups, in information manipulation has been largely overlooked. This evidence review aims to fill this gap by examining the various ways in which OC groups manipulate information to achieve their objectives and those of actors connected to them. Drawing on Nicholas Barnes' concept of 'political criminality' as well as on Makarenko’s OC-terrorism nexus framework, this study examines the varying degrees of proximity between criminal actors and the state …

This project examines how Russia is using illicit financial flows (IFF) to support its military campaign against Ukraine and to further its wider foreign policy goals. The scale of Russian use of illicit financial networks has increased rapidly since February 2022. Unless effectively countered, Russia's use of financial and economic tools will give it an advantage in its war against Ukraine and may begin to pose a potential systemic threat to international financial and trading systems. The research seeks to conceptualise how Russia uses illicit finance in political interference and information campaigns around the world, and how these dynamics may be changing in the new context of the war in Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia are leading to tectonic changes in Eurasia’s illicit scene. The war has disrupted licit and illicit supply chains throughout the region, changed routes of trafficking and shifted production of illicit commodities. This project aims to understand changing dynamics in respect of the following: a)  threats in borderlands and seaports; b) opportunities in neighbouring countries as legal companies and criminal enterprises step in to fill the void of meeting the demand on sanctioned goods in Russia; c) actors in smuggling and trafficking; and d) elite bargains related with illicit flows.

This project examines why third countries – countries neither sending sanctions or the target of them – either facilitate sanctions evasion and avoidance (SEA) or support efforts to counter it. It focuses on sanctions relating to Russia since February 2022 and it based on rapid review of the thematic literature on SEA and empirical research in 13 third countries. Our analysis examines how flows of Russian financial and human capital and patterns of SEA changed since February 2022; what factors affect either facilitation of or support to counter SEA; what are the types of individuals/organisations that facilitate SEA, and what methodologies and typologies do they use.

This project seeks to contribute to the ‘freeze to seize’ debate: how to move from temporary sanctions-based asset freezes of Russian-linked assets towards more permanent asset deprivation via criminal justice confiscation mechanisms. It does so by examining a range of established asset confiscation concepts and their operationalisation in specific jurisdictions, which have their basis not in sanctions designations but in evidentially-driven and judicially-overseen criminal justice processes. The research sets out the current limitations of UK civil recovery mechanisms and looks at examples of three alternative mechanisms (lowering the standard of proof, reversing the burden of proof and ‘societal danger’ models) across …