In recent years, concerns over information manipulation have grown, particularly the disinformation tactics employed by authoritarian regimes. Yet, the role of non-state actors, specifically organised crime (OC) groups, in shaping information landscapes remains overlooked. Drawing from Nicholas Barnes' 'political criminality' concept, this paper investigates the complex connections between criminal actors and the state. The research spans various regions, with a strong focus on Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, Russia, Moldova (Transnistria), and Albania.

Dr Tena Prelec

October 2023

Sanctions are a crucial tool for exerting influence internationally yet understanding of the impact of sanctions evasion or avoidance (SEA) and third-country involvement is limited. This report reveals that third countries are more likely to engage in SEA when they have trade and commercial capacity, particularly in professional advisory, financial services, shipping and logistics sectors. Private commercial actors within these sectors, with an economic interest in engaging in SEA may find opportunity to do so.

Dr Liam O’Shea, Olivia Allison, Gonzalo Saiz & Alexia Anna Hack

October 2023

This paper provides an analytical overview of how Russian actors and proxies are using illicit financial flows (IFF) to support Russian foreign policy goals. It shows how Russia has used illicit finance to fund political interference campaigns, promote disinformation, and support military operations outside Russia, including the international activities of the Wagner network. It calls for a holistic approach to tackling the issue by combining effective sanctions with systematic efforts to tackle money-laundering and illicit finance in key financial and logistical hubs, including in the UK and other Western countries.

Professor David Lewis & Dr Tena Prelec

August 2023

State capture occurs when a small number of influential actors in the public and private sectors collude to change rules, regulations, legislation and institutions to further their own narrow interests at the expense of the broader public interest. In South Africa, there have been widespread allegations that several state-owned enterprises and other agencies were infiltrated by persons close to President Jacob Zuma and that they radically altered the processes and functions of these entities to serve the interests of a few individuals and companies linked to Zuma. This research examines how one institution, the South African Revenue Service (SARS), was captured and the detrimental impact of this on the capacity of SARS to detect, investigate and prevent tax and financial crimes. The literature on state capture generally does not provide detailed accounts of how specific institutions are captured or the impact on their capability and functioning; this research suggests that the further case studies may lead to improvements in our understanding of the scale of the impacts of state capture on institutions in the public sphere.

Zenobia Ismail & Robin Richards

March 2023

This briefing note summarises research that explores alternative asset recovery mechanisms that could help respond to the immediate policy goal surrounding Russian-linked sanctioned assets, and also contribute to strengthening the broader asset recovery framework in the UK for the longer term.

Maria Nizzero

March 2023

Finding responses to illicit financial flows (IFFs) and preventing the extraction, movement and secretion of wealth from the licit global economy has become a growing policy preoccupation. The scale of IFFs and their continued growth has been linked to damaging consequences for governance and the building of peaceful, inclusive societies that achieve development for their citizens. This paper draws on research and evidence from by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) and beyond to explore how and why responses to IFFs are falling short.

Tuesday Reitano

June 2022

This briefing note analyses Russian illicit financial flows (IFF) and its possible influence on political parties and the wider body politic of western Europe. It argues for the need to place more focus on certain individuals, companies, and relationships, given the legal vagaries of financial flows linked to the Russian state. As Russia’s investigative units, prosecutorial bodies, and law courts lack independence, the vast majority of Russian IFF may not be illegal under Russian law (or at least a Russian court will not rule it to be) but could still constitute IFF and could be used for malign purposes in the countries where it is found.

Thomas Mayne

May 2022

This briefing note – part of a project advancing a new conceptual framework designed to improve our understanding of Russian illicit financial flows (IFFs) as linked to foreign policy (FP) aims – provides an overview of Russia’s economic presence in South Eastern Europe. It first considers its interaction with the post-Yugoslav region as a whole, then zooming into the patterns at play in Serbia and Montenegro. These two countries have had a dramatic change in relations with Russia in 2014, when Montenegro implemented sanctions after the annexation of Crimea, and Serbia did not. This juncture offers a clear opportunity to think about the extent to which IFF from Russia are linked to foreign policy considerations.

Tena Prelec

May 2022

This briefing note shows how Russian foreign policy in Africa facilitates illicit financial flows (IFF) into and out of the continent through two case studies. First, in Sudan, gold-mining ventures, supported by military investments, are being exploited by Russian and Sudanese political elites hit by Wester economic sanctions. Second, in Madagascar, Russian ‘political technologists’ influenced electoral processes by cultivating anti-Western sentiments and supporting Moscow-friendly candidates.

Catherine Owen

May 2022

This paper categorises the practices used by Russian Kremlin-connected actors to advance Russian illicit financial flows (IFF) and depicts them, as well as their relationships to one another and to IFF in a novel framework. It argues that conclusively identifying and tracing IFF in authoritarian environments is very difficult due to the politicised nature of authoritarian legal systems and the inevitable data gaps. Our framework seeks to remedy these challenges by mapping malign practices, enacted by Russian actors in collaboration with elite overseas partners to create conditions friendly to Russian IFF, across three vectors: 1) political activities, 2) media activities and 3) political violence. We argue that the deployment of these practices is deeply connected to Russian foreign policy objectives, which are built in part on informal and patronal relationships with domestic elites. Thus, the principal actors in Russian foreign policymaking and -doing are not state institutions but elites, intermediaries, private companies, and organised crime groups.

Catherine Owen, Tena Prelec & Tom Mayne

May 2022

This short evidence review paper, written before February 2022, looks at the links between corruption, crime and conflict in eastern Ukraine. As well as explaining the background to the conflict in eastern Ukraine (at the time of writing), the paper also looks at the pre-conflict situation with regard to organised crime and corruption and how organised crime and corruption play a role in, and have been impacted by, the conflict.

Iffat Idris

May 2022

This evidence review explores the literature on political will in relation to organised crime, kleptocracy, illicit finance, sanctions, trafficking and COVID-19. Findings demonstrate the importance of political will for effectively tackling SOC, illicit finance and transnational corruption, but also why it is so challenging to find political will, measure it and create demand for it.

Iffat Idris

May 2022